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Economists  overwhelmingly  support  free  internation-
al  trade.  According  to  a  2006  Economists’ Voice  survey, 
for example, 87% of economists polled agreed that “the 
U.S. should eliminate remaining tariffs and other barri-
ers to trade.” Yet a vocal community of activists opposes 
globalization due to concerns that trade exploits workers 
and the environment in the developing world. In response 
to these concerns, Congress has recently taken steps to 
make  pending  trade  agreements  contingent  on  trading 
partners abiding by international labor and environmen-
tal standards. And while campaigning for the Democratic 
presidential nomination, both Hillary Clinton and Barack 
Obama called for reopening NAFTA negotiations in order 
to include more stringent environmental and labor rules. 
Whether these proposed policy changes are motivated by 
altruism or by more familiar protectionist arguments, the 
new restrictions are likely to increase production costs in 
developing countries, ultimately increasing the price U.S. 
consumers pay for imported goods. However, this welfare 
loss may be at least partially offset if Americans derive sat-
isfaction from knowing that the imports they consume are 
produced in a safe, clean environment. 
In order to understand whether this proposed legisla-
tion is likely to have a positive net impact on American 
consumers, it is necessary to understand the premium they 
place on imported goods produced under stricter labor and 
environmental standards. A straightforward way to answer 
this question is to estimate the premium consumers are 
willing to pay for the “fair trade” designation. 
The Fair Trade Designation 
According to the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations Inter-
national, producers of agricultural commodities who meet 
environmental and labor standards that are broadly similar 
to those policymakers are currently proposing are guaran-
teed a price “that covers the cost of sustainable production 
Figure 1. Mean Bids for Conventional and Fair Trade 
Products (N = 122)











Information on Fair Trade Given to Participants 
The  following  statement  on  fair  trade  has  been  ap-
proved by a group of academic, religious, and commu-
nity leaders who have no financial stake in fair trade 
foods: 
The  fair  trade  movement  promotes  international 
labor, environmental, and social standards. The move-
ment focuses on exports from poorer countries such 
as Ecuador and Ghana to richer countries such as the 
United States. Standards may be voluntarily adhered to 
by importing firms, or enforced by governments. Pro-
posed and practiced fair trade policies vary widely, but 
most often take the form of minimum price support 
schemes for products such as bananas, cocoa, and cof-
fee. Non-government organizations also play a role in 
promoting fair trade standards by serving as indepen-
dent monitors of compliance with fair trade labeling 
requirements. 
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and living.” For example, as of De-
cember  2005  cocoa  producers  were 
guaranteed a price of either $1,750 
per metric ton if the world price for 
similarly graded cocoa was at or be-
low $1,600, or the world price plus 
$150  per  metric  if  the  world  price 
exceeded  $1,600.  At  the  time  this 
standard was implemented, the world 
price of cocoa was $1,519 per metric 
ton,  according  to  the  International 
Cocoa Organization. 
According  to  the  Fairtrade  La-
belling  Organizations  International 
worldwide sales of fair trade goods in-
creased by 41% in 2006 to $2 billion, 
making fair trade goods a small but 
rapidly growing segment of the larger 
market for “ethical goods.” TransFair 
USA,  a  California-based  nonprofit 
that certifies fair trade food products 
in  the  United  States,  currently  of-
fers fair trade certification for coffee, 
tea, herbs, cocoa and chocolate, fresh 
fruit, sugar, rice, and vanilla. 
Loureiro and Lotade (2005) use 
contingent  valuation  techniques  to 
estimate consumer willingness to pay   
for  the  fair  trade  designation.  The 
authors  find  that  85%  of  consum-
ers are willing to pay a positive pre-
mium for fair trade coffee, with the 
average consumer willing to pay 22¢ 
per pound more for fair trade coffee 
than for conventional coffee. Howev-
er, contingent valuation studies may 
be  vulnerable  to  hypothetical  bias. 
Cummings, Harrison, and Rutström 
(1995), for example, find that fewer 
than 40% of participants who indi-
cated that they would be willing to 
pay $3 for a calculator in a hypotheti-
cal  market  were  actually  willing  to 
buy the calculator when real payment 
was required. List and Gallet’s (2001) 
review of 29 experimental valuation 
studies found that hypothetical will-
ingness to pay estimates overstate real 
willingness to pay by roughly a factor 
of three. 
Experimental Design and Results 
In this section we present the de-
sign and results of a nonhypotheti-
cal experimental auction comparing 
shoppers’ willingness to pay for con-
ventional and fair trade food products. 
Lusk and Shogren (2007) provide an 
extensive review of the experimental 
auction  literature  and  demonstrate 
that  these  controlled  auctions  are 
enormously useful in examining con-
sumer preferences. Experimental auc-
tions  have,  for  example,  been  used 
to  examine  consumer  preferences 
for food safety, meat tenderness, and 
genetic modification. To our knowl-
edge, the results we present here are 
the first nonhypothetical estimate of 
consumer willingness to pay for fair 
trade goods. 
One  hundred  and  twenty-two 
shoppers  at  two  grocery  stores  in 
Harrisburg,  Pa.  participated  in  this 
study  in  October  2005.  According 
to the market research firm Acxiom, 
Harrisburg is one of the twenty most 
demographically representative metro 
areas in the United States. 
Participants bid on a 2 lb. bunch 
of bananas, a 2 lb. bunch of fair trade 
bananas, a 3.5 oz. chocolate bar, and 
a 3.5 oz. fair trade chocolate bar us-
ing  the  Becker-DeGroot-Marshak 
auction mechanism which is widely 
used by economists for this type of 
research. For a more detailed presen-
tation of the experimental design or 
participant  characteristics,  we  refer 
the  interested  reader  to  Rousu  and 
Corrigan (forthcoming). Participants 
in this type of auction submit their 
bids with the understanding that the 
selling price will be chosen at random. 
Anyone who submits a bid above this 
randomly determined price purchases 
the item at the random price. Anyone 
who submits a bid below this price 
purchases nothing. Because the price 
participants pay if they win the auc-
tion is not influenced by the bid they 
submit, there is no incentive for par-
ticipants to understate their true will-
ingness to pay. 
After  collecting  the  first  set  of 
bids,  the  experimenter  presented 
participants with objective informa-
tion  about  fair  trade  certification. 
The  exact  information  presented  to 
participants is shown in Box 1. Par-
ticipants then submitted another set 
of four bids. Participants understood 
that only one of the bidding oppor-
tunities would be binding and that 
bidding  opportunity  would  be  de-
termined randomly at the end of the 
experiment.
After the bids were collected and 
the binding bid and the selling price 
were  randomly  determined,  partici-
pants completed a brief exit survey. 
They were then paid $10 for partici-
pating in the study, and any transac-
tions agreed to were carried out.
Because we are primarily interested 
in the premium consumers are will-
ing to pay for stricter environmental 
and labor standards, we focus on bids 
submitted after participants received 
objective information about the fair 
trade designation. We estimate the fair 
trade premium by taking the differ-
ence between bids submitted for the 
fair trade and conventional versions 
of a product. We found that the me-
dian fair trade premium was zero for 
both bananas and chocolate, suggest-
ing that the typical Harrisburg shop-
per places no value on the fair trade 
designation. However, the mean fair 
trade premium was positive for both 
goods. Specifically, participants were, 
on average, willing to pay an 11¢ pre-
mium  for  fair  trade  bananas  and  a 
24¢ premium for fair trade chocolate. 
The mean bids submitted by partici-
pants are shown in Figure 1. Taken as 
a whole, these results suggest that the 
mean fair trade premium is driven by 
a minority of consumers who place a 
relatively high value on the fair trade 
designation. For example, one in ten 
participants was willing to pay at least 
a 50¢ premium for fair trade bananas 
or at least a $1.25 premium for fair 
trade chocolate.    2nd Quarter 2008 • 23(2)  CHOICES  
Conclusion: Don’t Mandate 
Stricter Standards 
Congress would like our trading part-
ners  to  abide  by  stricter  labor  and 
environmental  standards.  In  cases 
where these standards impose a bind-
ing constraint on foreign producers, 
the  associated  increase  in  produc-
tion costs is equivalent to a nontariff 
barrier  to  trade.  Other  examples  of 
nontariff  barriers  include  voluntary 
export restrictions in the automobile 
industry, agricultural price supports, 
and  restrictions  on  U.S.  gamblers 
limiting their access to foreign online 
gambling sites.
Basic  economic  theory  predicts 
that these kinds of restrictions benefit 
domestic producers who compete di-
rectly with the affected foreign firms, 
while  simultaneously  reducing  con-
sumer surplus. The net effect is a de-
crease in domestic welfare. However, 
if  domestic  consumers  prefer  goods 
produced under stricter environmen-
tal  and  labor  standards,  the  “warm 
glow” they receive from consuming 
such goods may offset the lost con-
sumer surplus to such an extent as to 
make the imposition of stricter stan-
dards welfare enhancing for society. 
Our results show that while the 
typical grocery shopper in a represen-
tative U.S. city derives no value from 
the  fair  trade  designation—and,  by 
extension, the stricter environmental 
and labor standards that go with it—
a minority of shoppers place substan-
tial value on that designation. Under 
the current market–based system of 
optional fair trade labeling, individu-
als who derive added value from con-
suming goods produced in a clean, 
safe environment are free to buy fair 
trade products. Imposing stricter en-
vironmental and labor standards on 
all  imports  is  likely  to  increase  the 
prices consumers pay, but it is unlikely 
to generate enough of a “warm glow” 
to offset this price increase given that 
the consumers who place the high-
est value on these stricter standards 
have  presumably  already  embraced 
fair trade certification. Therefore, we 
conclude that current market–based 
practices  are  preferable  to  rewriting 
trade agreements.
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